## 1AC

### Shaw Affirmative

#### Profiling and hostile environments ARE the status quo ----- targeted killing has not changed the game but continued the violent business as usual --- the executive has labeled themselves as the Predator Empire, operating under the framework of presumptive guilt, refusing to delineate the distinction between livelihoods of individuals and their “personalities” --- this exemplifies an unaccountable politics of purity that can cast its power, both inclusion and exclusion, to non-white communities abroad and at home

Shaw 2013 (Ian G. R. Shaw, Professor of ~~Human~~ Geography at the University of Glasgow, “Predator Empire: The Geopolitics of US Drone Warfare”, Geopolitics, DOI:10.1080/14650045.2012, 2013) – we disagree with our author’s anthropocentric, able-ist, gendered language

The Double Tap

The debate over whether or not drone strikes are a “success” is usually focused on their ability to target and eliminate “militants”. This **technological enframing** **fails to consider what** **everyday life** is

like for the broader populations that live under the drones53**.** Two recent publications are noteworthy in this respect: a 2010 report headed by Christopher Rogers of CIVIC 54, which interviewed over 160 Pakistani Civilians suffering direct losses from the U.S. strikes, and an extensive 2012 report released by The Stanford International ~~Human~~ Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and the Global Justice Clinic at the New York University School of Law 55, which interviewed 130 people, including victims, witnesses, and other experts. Both reports provide firsthand testimony by those civilian populations living on the fleshy side of the disposition matrix.

Stanford and NYU’s report has four main findings. First, civilians are routinely killed, often in so-called “double tap” strikes that kill anyone that tends to the dead and wounded in the wake of an attack. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism claims that at least 50 civilians and “first responders” had been killed after they rushed to help victims of drone strikes 56. One interviewee, Hayatullah Ayoub Khan, recounted a particularly harrowing experience57. A drone missile was fired at a car around 300 meters in front of him while driving. Hayatullah exited his vehicle and slowly approached the wreckage, cautious that he might be a victim of a follow-up strike. He walked close enough to the car to see a flailing arm inside. The injured occupant “yelled that he should leave immediately because another missile would likely strike”. Hayatullah did as instructed, returning to his car just as a second missile struck the survivor. The second finding from Stanford and NYU is that beyond direct physical and monetary damage, the constant hovering of drones has lead to a deeply entrenched psychological malaise amongst civilians. Many community members now shy away from social gatherings, including important tribal meetings and funerals, with some parents even electing to keep their children away from school. Third, there is scant evidence that the strikes have made the U.S. “safer”. The “evidence suggests that US strikes have facilitated recruitment to violent non-state armed groups, and motivated further violent attacks”58. Finally, the CIA’s program of targeted killings undermines respect for, and adherence to, international law and sets a dangerous precedent.

The death of innocent people is a common theme among interviewees in both reports. CIVIC interviewed Guy Nawaz, a resident of North Waziristan who was watering his fields when he heard the screech and boom of a Hellfire: “I rushed to my house when I heard the blast. When I arrived I saw my house and my brother’s house completely destroyed and all at home were dead”59. Eleven of his family were killed, including his wife, two sons and two daughters, as well as his older brother, his wife and four children. He continued, “We were living a happy life and I didn’t have any links with the Taliban. My family members were innocent... I wonder, why was I victimized?”60 Safia lost her 30 year-old husband and 7 year-old son when a militant vehicle was struck by a drone as it passed her house. She said that “I hope the Taliban are all killed. But I hope the drone attacks are stopped immediately. They are not effective against the Taliban hideouts. USA and Pakistan should realize the fact that for the last 5-6 years the drone attacks have been taking place but no Taliban has left extremism or terrorism”61. Stories of emotional and psychological trauma were frequently recounted in both reports, with medical professionals diagnosing the **“anticipatory anxiety”** and “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder” (PTSD) many civilians now suffer with. As Safdar Dawar, President of the Tribal Union of Journalists explains 62:

If I am walking in the market, I have this fear that maybe the person walking next to me is going to be a target of the drone. If I’m shopping, I’m really careful and scared. If I’m standing on the road and there is a car parked next to me, I never know if that is going to be the target. Maybe they will target the car in front of me or behind me. Even in mosques, if we’re praying, we’re worried that maybe one person who is standing with us praying is wanted. So, wherever we are, we have this fear of drones.

Both reports are an important challenge to the legitimization of drone warfare, especially in light of recent figures by a Washington Post-ABC News poll that found 83 percent of those Americans surveyed “approve” of the use of drones against suspected terrorists overseas63. The near-impossibility of travel to FATA by journalists and researchers outside or inside of Pakistan means that these reports give a rare glimpse of life on the ground. These shared stories of the women, children, and men of FATA “disturbs and disrupts the hegemonic foreign policy gaze”64, and refocuses the lens of the White House’s geographical imagination. Drone warfare in Pakistan, just like the “war on terror” more generally, is not a universal experience65: it is differentially distributed and violently uneven, split between suburban pilots that sit in air-conditioned trailers and scan video screens, adjusting their “soda straw” digital view of the world with a joystick, and the everyday experiences told by the people of FATA. While not wanting to overstate the case, these stories are important for [re-focusing] ~~rehumanising~~ the abstract discourses of security strategy and the bureaucratic spaces of the disposition matrix.The Predator Empire

The Biopolitics of the Predator Empire

In this section I explore how “life” is the target for the Predator Empire. Although I do not want to downplay the role the American military plays in coordinating and performing violence across the globe, my focus is on the CIA’s **drone wars because the evidence from the NSC and DSG suggests** a diffuse (**if by no means singular**) drift towards the dronification of national security. So too does the National Counterterrorism Center’s disposition matrix and John Brennan’s “playbook”66 establish a permanent precedent for extrajudicial strikes that exist outside of Title 10 authorities67. This means that the CIA will in all likelihood remain heavily invested in targeted killings for decades to come, despite 9/11 Commission recommendations that paramilitary activities are transferred to the Department of Defense 68. The agency’s 2,000-strong Counterterrorist Center has transformed itself from an intelligence gathering machine to a major player in “kinetic operations”69. But who counts as a “target” is at times ambiguous. As I previously explored in the above NSS and NSC, there is a deliberate widening of the net surrounding who counts as an affiliate. If, as Dillon and Reid suggest, “**The history of security is a history of the** changing problematisation **of what it is to be a political subject and politically subject**”70, then the discursive baptism of the affiliate marks a new, if not unprecedented political subject. This is further complicated because affiliate are not always identifiable individuals such as an al-Qa’ida leader in North Waziristan. Instead, and as I will argue in the remainder of this section, affiliates can be threatening patterns of life that are coded, catalogued, and eliminated.

As the name directly implies, targeted killings usually involve a known target. In February 2011, John Rizzo, the 63-year-old former General Counsel of the CIA, discussed the agency’s practice of targeted killings71. Analysts and ‘targeters’ located in the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center select individuals for “neutralization” based on intelligence reports. This report must then clear a team of lawyers before it signed off by the Counsel. But this isn’t always the normal bureaucratic practice. In the summer of 2008, former CIA Director Michael Hayden successfully lobbied President Bush to dispense with drone targeting constraints that were restricted to known individuals72: “For the first time the CIA no longer had to identify its target by name; now the ‘signature’ of a typical al Qaeda motorcade, or of a group entering a known al Qaeda safe house, was enough to authorize a strike”73. The devil here is in the detail. Unlike “personality strikes”, where the person’s identity is located on one of the CIA’s classified kill lists or the disposition matrix, **a signature is constructed from** observing and cataloguing a pattern of life**—**coding the behavior and geography **of individuals; targeting their very lifeworld**. This new targeting regime may have led to a rapid escalation of drone strikes and an increase of the number of people that were killed in Pakistan. Between 2004 and 2007 there were 10 drone attacks, but between the pivot year of 2008 and 2012, this figure leapt to 333 74. In Table 1, I have calculated the percentages of militant “leaders” killed in drone strikes in order to illustrate the decreasing number of high-level “commanders” that are subject to the CIA’s strikes. While this in itself does not prove that personality strikes have given way to signature killings, it does at least suggest the widening net of those subject to drone attacks in Pakistan.

To illustrate how easily innocent civilians can get caught up in a signature strike, recall the 2010 CIVIC report once again. In one story, the Taliban visited the residence of a man named Daud Khan and demanded lunch. The father reluctantly consented, fearing reprisal if he refused the fighters: “The very next day our house was hit... My only son Khaliq was killed. I saw his body, completely burned”. In this case, it seems that Khan’s son had unwittingly become “affiliated” with the Taliban. Due to the unavoidable intermingling of such militants with the lives of ordinary people, it is likely that signature strikes could have killed many innocent people. According to the 2012 Stanford and NYU report, a signature strike probably place on March 17, 2011. The CIA fired at least two missiles into a large gathering—a jirga led by a decorated public servant—near a bus depot in the town of Datta Khel, North Waziristan. The U.S. insists that all were militants. And yet, the overwhelming evidence suggests that most of the 42 people killed were civilians 75. Of the four suspected Taliban militants identified by the Associated Press in this strike, only one has ever been identified by name. As a 2011 Washington Post report notes, “**Independent information** about who the CIA kills in signature strikes in Pakistan is **scarce**”76. Other officials in the U.S. State Department have complained that the classified criteria used by the CIA to construct a “signature” are too lax: “The joke was that when the CIA sees ‘three guys doing jumping jacks,’ the agency thinks it’s a terrorist training camp”77.

Table 1 about here Table 2 about here

Of course, drones continue to target known individuals on kill lists, performing a well-rehearsed “reduction of places and people to an abstract space”78, but at least since 2008 the Predator Empire has enforced a distinctive twist on a biopolitical logic based on targeting patterns of life. While there is much variation on what counts as biopolitics79, it was a term first coined by Michel Foucault in Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France80, a series that Chris Philo describes as the “decisive hinge” in Foucault’s “switch from being a critical historian of the body to being the critical historian of population”81. In classical theories of sovereignty, the sovereign can “either have people put to death or let them live’ 82, and its power over life “is exercised only when the sovereign can kill”83. This sovereign power became supplemented by a new “right to make live and let die”84 in the nineteenth-century. This transformation involved a shift from disciplinary technologies that targeted “[~~life] man-as-body”~~ (what Foucault calls an “anatomo-politics”) to regulatory mechanisms at the level of “[~~life] man-as-species~~” (what Foucault calls a “biopolitics”). Biological processes such as fertility rates became political problems and sites of intervention, where the aim is was to “establish a sort of homeostasis”85 within the population which “consists in making live and letting die” and “achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers”86. All of might be termed “State control of the biological”87.

Dillon and Reid88 extend Foucault’s biopolitics of the population to a biopolitics of the molecular. They argue that as the life sciences changed over the last century, so too did the “bios” of biopolitics, becoming ever more processual, spontaneous, and based on codes (such as DNA). This “recombinant biopolitics” fed directly into the visions of Rumsfeld’s “Revolution in Military Affairs” to create a new organizing principle “concerned with surveillance and the accumulation and analysis of data concerning behaviour, the patterns which behaviour displays and the profiling of individuals within the population”89. Under this new metaphysics of power, in which “power/knowledge is very much more concerned to establish profiles, patterns and probabilities” 90, information is a weapon and securing territory is no longer viewed with the same importance as securing patterns of life.

For Foucault, this means that dangerousness, what is to be secured, is no longer an actualized danger, but is located within behavioral potentialities. Or as Bruce Braun suggests, “Today, security’s principal answer to the problem of ‘unknown unknowns’ is the speculative act of pre-emption, which takes as its target potential rather than actual risks”91. Consequently, dangerous signatures or patterns of life are assessed on their very potential to become dangerous.

In the tribal areas of Pakistan, for example, most people killed by U.S. drones have not been al-Qa’ida fighters. In fact, the number of al-Qa’ida militants eliminated has been just 8% under the Obama administration92. This means that a far greater number of people who played no part in the attacks of September 11, 2001 have been vaporized by Hellfire missiles. Former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, went so far as to question whether “killings carried out in 2012 can be justified as in response to [events] in 2001”93. The presumptive “guilt” of many of those killed in Pakistan today is thus constructed around the so-called “immanent” threat they pose to the U.S. Homeland: a pre-emptive, future-oriented biopolitics that exists in an exceptional space outside of centuries of international [peace] ~~humanitarian~~ law. These Pakistani “affiliates”—which include the Pakistan Taliban and Haqqani Network members, are part of a much wider expansion of who count as affiliates in a globalizing drone war.

The very condition that makes a biopolitics possible in the first place then—life—has become a force to be coded and secured. As Dillon describes it, “The biopolitics of security today is precisely this political emergency of emergence instituting a regime of exception grounded in the endless calibration of the infinite number of ways in which the very circulation of life threatens life rather than some existential friend/enemy distinction”94. The appearance of the affiliate in the NSS and NSC marks the emergence of a far more process-based, even epidemiological understanding of danger, where the “threat” is located in what individuals could become in the future, and security is defined as anticipating and eliminating the emergence of such danger. For Dillon, this erasure of the concept of [life] “~~man~~” by targeting “life” means that “it is no longer adequate to judge lifelike bodies in terms of the essence of that existential otherness definite of the enemy alone, for every-body is a continuously emergent body-in-formation comprised of contingently adaptive rather than fixed properties”95. The “evental”96 nature of this “emergent emergency” helps explains the conditions surrounding the CIA’s shift in targeting practices from personality strikes to signature strikes and the changing object of national security from al-Qa’ida the organization to al-Qa’ida affiliates. In both cases the targets for the Predator Empire are not simply actualized forms of danger, but virtualized forms of emergence that may become threats in the future97.

The Spatial Topology of the Predator Empire

According to research by Nick Turse, the U.S. military operates 1,100 bases across the planet98. Many of these sites exist in shadow because they are used for paramilitary operations by Special Forces and the CIA. These bases range in size and location, but a recent and favored strategy of the U.S. military has been to construct skeletal “lily pads” that are scattered in remote outposts across the globe. Chalmers Johnson, author of the book Blowback, wrote back in 2004 that “[t]his vast network of American bases on every continent except Antarctica actually constitutes a new form of empire – an empire of bases with its own geography not likely to be taught in any high school geography class”99. While this “new form of empire” has been growing for decades, the proliferation of remotely piloted aircraft certainly marks a new phase in its evolution—the Predator Empire. Everywhere and nowhere, drones have become sovereign tools of life and death, where with “the lives and deaths of subjects become rights only as a result of the will of the sovereign”100.

The Predator Empire is underpinned by an expanding geography of drone bases in and around the “areas of concern” mentioned in the NSS and NSC. There are now at least 60 bases used for U.S. military and CIA drones—from medium sized Predators and Reapers to experimental systems such as the “Sentinel” that was captured by Iran. As part of their surveillance of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and Mali, U.S. drones have flown out of Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, the Seychelles, Niger, and many more 101. These geographic locations are intended to develop overlapping circles of surveillance. The jewel in the crown in this new form of empire is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which is sandwiched between Somalia and Yemen. This secretive 500-acre base is the first ever camp dedicated solely to tracking and eliminating al-Qa’ida and its “affiliates”102. Around 16 drones either take off or land every day at the base, which has its origins as an outpost in the French Foreign Legion. Activities at Camp Lemonnier increased in 2010 after 8 Predators were delivered, turning the camp into a fully-fledged drone base. The CIA first shipped its Predators to the camp in 2002 103, and it now acts in collaboration with the secretive Joint Special Operations Command. A total of 3,200 U.S. troops, civilians, and contractors are assigned to the camp where they “train foreign militaries, gather intelligence and dole out [developing] ~~humanitarian~~ aid across East Africa as part of a campaign to prevent extremists from taking root”104. In short, Camp Lemonnier is the concrete symbol of a Predator Empire no longer bound to Pakistan or Afghanistan, and expanding across the Africa.

But despite this concrete presence, the CIA’s fleet of secret drones has little interest in securing “territory” in the traditional sense, seeking instead to secure and eliminate patterns of life that threaten. In Security, Territory, Population105 Foucault details how biopower is not exercised across territory per se 106, but through spaces of circulation or a “milieu” of ~~human [animals] and nonhuman [animals]~~ multiplicities that constitute life-in-the-making. Similarly he wrote that the last domain of biopolitics is “control over relations between the ~~human [as animals~~], or ~~human beings insofar as they are a species, insofar as they are living beings~~, and their environment, the milieu in which they live”107. Here, Foucault refers to both natural and [~~human animal-made] manmade~~ environments, where mastery of the environment is translated into mastery of the population. Sloterdijk goes so far as to state that “The 20th century will be remembered as the period whose decisive idea consisted in targeting not the body of the enemy, but his environment”108. Indeed, securing the atmosphere has continually transformed understandings of space, power, and sovereignty 109. The question is therefore how is the environment a biopolitical target for the Predator Empire? How is the environment understood and controlled? Unlike forms of environmental intervention that leave a gigantic “footprint” in the soil of the earth, such as the counterinsurgency pursued in Iraq, the Predator Empire pursues a **different kind of spatial biopolitics**; a virtual intervention where what is captured is not “hearts and minds” but endless streams of information that are broadcast back to the Homeland. This suggests that **the direction of power is not just an outward projection**—as with the geographic expansionism that traditionally defines “American power projection” across the globe. Rather, it also suggests an inward power collection: defined here as the power to incorporate, to bring closer.

The drone continues to transform U.S. biopower by bringing distant “areas of concern” such as the tribal areas of Pakistan into the gaze of pilots, targeters, and analysts in Creetch Air Force Base in Nevada. This power to make the faraway intimate is “a non-symmetrical power topology which sometimes coincides with a geographically materialized power topology and sometimes does not”110. Predators “fold” space with an unparalleled level of aeromobility, reducing the importance that geographic distance and obstacles have in separating “there” from “here”. This power topology is not strictly exercised across space then, but rather, it is the capacity to crumple an environment by digitizing it. As Allen states, “The use of real-time technologies to create a simultaneous presence in a diversity of settings is, for instance, just one way in which relations of presence and absence may be reconfigured so that the gap between ‘here and there’ is bridged relationally, and distance itself is no longer understood simply as a metric”111. The 2012 DSG makes it clear that physical boots on the ground are not part of the strategic environment of the future. The Predator Empire therefore marks the continuing evolution from a reliance on a topographic, ground-intensive empire to a topological, aerial empire. Airpower and aeromobilities has always been a central tenet of U.S. military strategy of course. As Adey summarizes, “From the air raids of the Blitz to the newest [uninhabited] ~~unmanned~~ reconnaissance aircraft, aeromobilities provide both promise and possibility, as well as dread, terror, destruction and death’112. And while it is undeniable that the CIA’s ghost war requires an expanding network of drone bases, such a Droneworld is not the end point of power—it is the architecture for the coding, cataloging, and eliminating of life in “real time”, on a scale that is historically unprecedented. It is within the unique topological spatiality of the Predator Empire that targeting killings become ever more decentralized across the planet, even as the power to take life is centralized in the hands of the executive branch of government.

When Obama stated that “We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense” in his inaugural address, he appealed to a biopolitics that is the hallmark of our geopolitical condition. The distinctiveness and coherence of “friend” and “enemy” has seemingly melted away into more amorphous patterns of life that are located across Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa. Although Foucault goes to create lengths detailing how biological life is included in politics, and how technologies exist “to control the series of random events that can occur in a living mass”113, he also asks how ‘is it possible for a political power to kill, to call for deaths, to demand deaths, to give the order to kill...? 114 He answers quite specifically with racism as “the precondition for exercising the right to kill”115. Certainly, the Pashtun residents in the tribal areas of Pakistan are caught in a net of violent colonial language116 and laws117 inherited from the British Raj. But such violence must constantly be performed and is thus reliant on the technologies and spatialities of state power 118. The civilians living and dying in Pakistan, whose families and friends were interviewed in the 2010 CIVIC report and the 2012 Stanford and New York University report, are exposed to an unaccountable surveillance apparatus that scrutinizes their patterns of life from thousands of miles away. Their vulnerability is inseparable from the topological spatial power of the Predator Empire.

#### Lee and I take a position that targeted killings by the United States Federal Government should be restricted

#### This network of secrecy precludes an effective debate about drones --- engaging the policy-intricacies of executive drone power is anti-thetical to patting oneself on their back, and in the context of the topic the affirmative is necessary to bring to discussion debates that happen in closed doors ---- our affirmative is a form of informing an increasingly disconnected public about the spread of drones --- our 1AC provides a heuristic that allows for our ability to interrogate and discuss how racist and xenophobic policies are conducted by law enforcement

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Conclusions

By introducing the term Predator Empire I do not want to suggest that U.S. extrajudicial killings are in any way “new”. Rather, I want to show how U.S. national security strategy is transforming alongside the rise of the drone; creating the geopolitical conditions for a permanent war waged from the heart of Washington D.C. The Predator, manufactured by General Atomics, was the first drone used by the U.S. for a targeted killing in Afghanistan in 2002. Since then, the CIA’s model of extrajudicial assassination has moved from the periphery to the center of a dronified form of state violence. This is a battle that is spearheaded by bureaucrats and White House officials that wear suits rather than uniforms, and wage war with spreadsheets rather than rifles. It is a different kind of empire, one in which U.S. bases resemble outposts like Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. This shift is encapsulated in the 2011 National Counterterrorism Strategy and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. These documents mobilize an amorphous “everywhere war”119 against vaguely defined “affiliates”. Of course, the “war on terror” has always been a type of governmentality 120 that inserts itself into the population, whether at airports, borders 121, or other security checkpoints, where biometric scanning segregates “legitimate mobilities” from “illegitimate mobilities”122. The CIA’s signature **strikes extend and rework this form of algorithmic calculation to target threatening patterns of life**. And this is realized by a topological power that folds the spaces of the affiliate into the surveillance machinery of the Homeland.

The Predator Empire thus marks the continuation of biopolitics by other means—namely an aerial ghost war that is central to U.S. national security. These targeted killings represent the crystallization of what could be called America’s “one percent war”: **a war that only affects around one percent of the U.S. population: those profiting in the military-industrial complex and those pilots sitting in cubicles staring at “Death TV”.** The other 99 percent remain alienated from a nebulous and permanent war waged by robots in the borderlands of the planet. This has the effect of creating two geographic and imaginary distances: **between drone pilots and their targets**, and between the **Predator Empire and the public**. And with so much of the violence performed by the CIA’s paramilitary wing, an official [refusal to acknowledge] ~~silence~~ drowns out any murmurings that surface in an otherwise subdued Congress. So too does the replacement of ~~human~~ troops with robotic warriors reduce the threshold of going to war. Beginning on April 23rd, 2011, American drones began six months of strikes against Qaddafi’s faltering regime in Libya. Crucially they were not authorized by the so-called Congressional “War Powers Resolution” designed to curb executive power. Peter Singer writes that “Choosing to make the operation [uninhabited] ~~unmanned~~ proved critical to initiating it without Congressional authorization”, adding “Like it or not, the new standard we’ve established ... is that presidents need to seek approval only for operations that send people into harm’s way — not for those that involve waging war by other means”125.

Looking forward, the consequences of this dronification of state violence are only coming into focus, although I think three outcomes are almost certain. First of all, consider “drone creep”: the use of drones in everyday settings by the police and other civilian agencies. One of the biggest trends in recent years has been the adoption of drone technology for law enforcement, particularly within the U.S. where Predator drones are used by Customs and Border Patrol along the borders with Mexico and Canada. And at the end of 2011, U.S. police in North Dakota made their first arrest with the aid of a Predator drone. This type of police surveillance is set to increase after the recent passage of The Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act in 2012.

This expansion feeds into a wider drone “arms race” across the globe. In 2012 the Government Accountability Office revealed that over 75 countries have now acquired some form of drone, with the U.S. and Israel remaining the global export leaders.

Perhaps the emergence of drone-on-drone warfare is just around the corner; after all, there is no shortage of political will, nor is there a shortage of non-state actors that will redefine the rules of the game.

Second, in the hunt for affiliates in FATA, the CIA’s drone strikes continue to alienate the larger Pakistani population127. Tom Engelhardt describes drones as “blowback weapons” with Nick Turse adding: “Over the last decade, a more-is-better mentality has led to increased numbers of drones, drone bases, drone pilots, and drone victims, but not much else. Drones may be effective in terms of generating body counts, but they appear to be even more successful in generating animosity and creating enemies”128. Even if al-Qa’ida and its affiliates have indeed “metastasized” across Africa, moving from the tribal areas of Pakistan to new fronts in Somalia, Yemen, and the Sahel, this geographic shift must be seen as the inevitable outcome of an expanding Predator Empire. Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst and Obama counterterrorism adviser was blunt in his diagnosis of targeted killings: “The problem with the drone is it’s like your lawn mower. You’ve got to mow the lawn all the time. The minute you stop mowing, the grass is going to grow back”129. But perhaps this is the very point: blowback sustains a permanent war.

Third, the Predator Empire will continue to violate national sovereignty on a number of fronts, as the technology challenges the very sanctity of territory 130. Indeed, it is difficult to keep track of an expanding battlespace spreads horizontally across Africa, and vertically into the earth's upper atmospheres. Furthermore, the drone war appears to be in direct contravention of international ~~humanitarian~~ law on numerous fronts131. U.S. strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya have all taken place in the shadow of law, and set a dangerous precedent that will no doubt be emulated across the globe by a range of state and non-state actors. Indeed, the legal violations of the Predator Empire are mirrored in its territorial violations: both are locked together in a legal-lethal space132. Perhaps the significance held by ground bases, such as Camp Lemonnier, will begin to erode as aircraft carriers enjoy a renewed importance as the Predator Empire migrates along the Pacific Ocean towards China133. Drones are under development by the U.S. Navy that can take off and land autonomously from a carrier. This, combined with increasing developments in “swarm” technology, as well as an escalation of Special Operations forces, sets the stage for a world in which a highly mobile force, answerable only to the executive branch, can drop down from the sky at a minute’s notice—sometimes with a kick at the door, other times with a Hellfire.

While the Predator Empire may be assembled with dozens rather than hundreds of flight orbits, it is essential that the wholesale psychological damage that is being wrought upon thousands of people is never eclipsed by a technological enframing that so often shields the unbearable[ness] ~~humanity~~ of it all. Targeted killings are quickly becoming a “post-political” background issue and a noise that few listen to. This is why the civilian voices from Pakistan and elsewhere need to be heard, since they signify the fundamental "worldly" damage caused by drone strikes, well beyond the "surgical" metaphors that circulate in official state narratives. Indeed, Washington’s permanent war is not even an ethical issue for most of the public: it is simply “common sense” to use Predators to solve problems. An intervention is therefore needed to reposition what counts as ~~human~~ security away from this entrenched logic of “death-as-success".

#### The devils are in the details --- understanding details about policy is critical for us to better debate about the implications of unaccountable profiling and introduction of violence --- it can help us create a community of acknowledgement which is key

Hughes 2012 (Evin, Georgia Southern Univ. [Float Like a Plane, Sting Like a Bomb: The Ethics of US Drone Attacks](http://nmcenter.org/attachments/awards_pieces/19/The_Ethics_of_US_Drone_Attacks.docx) [www.ncte.org/library/NCTEFiles/About/Awards/.../Hughes\_Evin.pdf](http://www.ncte.org/library/NCTEFiles/About/Awards/.../Hughes_Evin.pdf). edited for gendered/able-ist language)

What Ali was able to do through his nonviolent rhetoric that is still relevant to this day was successfully make millions of people “bear witness” to the violence and irrationality of war. For example, say you are watching the news with a roommate and the news anchor, within her nicely lit and air conditioned studio, talks in a monotone about the deaths of civilians in a Pakistani market by a drone strike, and your roommate immediately changes the channel, not giving the terrible story another thought. Your roommate doesn’t understand the gravity of that devastation any more than the news anchor does; neither understands the significant socio-economical problems that the drone strike has caused in that area. How about the [person] sitting behind the joystick, the Nintendo-war-controller, pressing the buttons to release the Hellfire missiles like Mario firing at Bowser? Though the drone operator of all people probably knows the extent of the devastation [they are] causing, [they refuse] to think about it, [they hide] the truth from [them]selves. The drone “pilot,” the unenthusiastic anchor, your roommate—they are all complicit. Shoshana Felman, influential in raising issues connected with Holocaust testimony and what is called the “crisis of witnessing,” says that those that misunderstand or hide what they see are unable to take that information and “translate…[it]…spontaneously and simultaneously into meaning” (Felman 212). Famous psychologists Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan described this as disavowal—a defense mechanism in which a person refuses to recognize the reality of a traumatic perception (Evans 44). Through speeches recited on college campuses, Ali urged thousands of students to bear witness to the problems of integration and segregation, hate, and the Vietnam War. In one such speech, he links the violence in Vietnam caused by the war to the violence in the states; he stated that he would rather fight what was going on in a legal way. Not by war in a foreign country, but by nonviolent resistance right here in the United States. “Whatever the punishment, whatever the persecution is for standing up for my beliefs, even if it means facing machine-gun fire that day, I’ll face it…” (Hauser 187). Through 6 this speech, Ali led as example to all those students in the crowd, to all those seeing and not choosing to accept reality, to all those in disavowal. What Felman proposes is a community of [acknowledgement] ~~seeing~~: a space into which “we can bring into consciousness what is unconscious in us”—like the college auditoriums and classrooms where Ali conducted his speeches—to analyze and make sense of events as a community (Amy 67). It is the very nature of the violence of the “war on terror” that does not allow a community of [acknowledgement] ~~seeing~~. The media-attack on these countries by ingratiating news anchors take the American people and place them onto a platform where they are unable to reach a community of seeing, unable to argue the ethics of this war. We are divided, separated from the truth. Democratic representatives John Conyers, Dennis Kuncinich and many more, were calling for a truth as a community of officials when they wrote letters to the president demanding for him to publicly release the criteria on which be would elect people to be attacked by drones on his infamous kill list (Heuvel)—there has been no more coverage of the letters in the media. Unless we become conscious as a community of the truth of the violence we are creating, unless we bear witness and develop a community of acknowledgment ~~seeing~~, we are doomed to be “locked into violences we cannot escape” (Amy 69).

#### The refusal to deliberate over drone policy risks public apathy because of the invisible nature of drone warfare ---- the affirmative brings an opportunity to re-engage the public to challenge presidential action

Druck 2012 [Judah A. Druck, law associate at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Cornell Law School graduate, magna cum laude graduate from Brandeis University, “Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare,” <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf>]

The practical effects of this move toward a technology-driven, and¶ therefore limited, proxy style of warfare are mixed. On the one hand,¶ the removal of American soldiers from harm’s way is a clear benefit,124¶ as is the reduced harm to the American public in general. For that,¶ we should be thankful. But there is another effect that is less easy to¶ identify: public apathy. By increasing the use of robotics and decreasing the probability of harm to American soldiers, modern warfare has¶ “affect[ed] the way the public views and perceives war” by turning it¶ into “the equivalent of sports fans watching war, rather than citizens¶ sharing in its importance.”125 As a result, the American public has¶ slowly fallen victim to the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare; when the risks of harm to American soldiers abroad and civilians¶ at home are diminished, so too is the public’s level of interest in foreign military policy.126¶ In the political sphere, this effect snowballs into both an uncaring¶ public not able (or willing) to effectively mobilize in order to challenge presidential action and enforce the WPR, and a Congress whose¶ own willingness to check presidential military action is heavily tied to¶ public opinion.127 Recall, for example, the case of the Mayaguez,¶ where potentially unconstitutional action went unchecked because¶ the mission was perceived to be a success.128 Yet we can imagine that¶ most missions involving drone strikes will be “successful” in the eyes of the public: even if a strike misses a target, the only “loss” one needs to¶ worry about is the cost of a wasted missile, and the ease of deploying¶ another drone would likely provide a quick remedy. Given the political risks associated with making critical statements about military action, especially if that action results in success,129 we can expect even¶ less congressional WPR enforcement as more military engagements¶ are supported (or, at the very least, ignored) by the public. In this¶ respect, the political reaction to the Mayaguez seems to provide an example of the rule, rather than the exception, in gauging political reactions within a technology-driven warfare regime.¶ Thus, when the public becomes more apathetic about foreign affairs as a result of the limited harms associated with technology-driven¶ warfare, and Congress’s incentive to act consequently diminishes, the¶ President is freed from any possible WPR constraints we might expect¶ him to face, regardless of any potential legal issues.130 Perhaps unsurprisingly, nearly all of the constitutionally problematic conflicts carried out by presidents involved smaller-scale military actions, rarely¶ totaling more than a few thousand troops in direct contact with hostile forces.131 Conversely, conflicts that have included larger forces,¶ which likely provided sufficient incentive for public scrutiny, have¶ generally complied with domestic law.132¶ The result is that as wars become more limited,133 unilateral presidential action will likely become even more unchecked as the triggers¶ for WPR enforcement fade away. In contrast with the social and political backlash witnessed during the Civil War, World War I, the Vietnam¶ War, and the Iraq War, contemporary military actions provide insufficient incentive to prevent something as innocuous and limited as a¶ drone strike. Simply put, technology-driven warfare is not conducive¶ to the formation of a substantial check on presidential action.134

#### Engaging in the political sciences to create solutions for drones helps us learn about the details and clarifies the solutions necessary

Omar Bashir writes on “How to Improve the Drones Debate” in 2012 (Omar, Princeton PhD candidate. How to Improve the Drones Debate http://themonkeycage.org/2012/11/15/how-to-improve-the-drones-debate/)

Most news articles about drones cover some new development, claim to raise new ethical questions, and mention superficially the need for greater transparency and/or accountability. Specific recommendations for change are rare or rarely helpful ([this](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-drone-war-demands-accountability/2012/11/01/56627964-2380-11e2-8448-81b1ce7d6978_story_1.html) recent editorial calls for strikes to be subject to congressional review, but they [already are](http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/25/nation/la-na-drone-oversight-20120625)). There may be an opportunity for political scientists to contribute by formulating and floating ideas about safeguards that address pressing ethical concerns. For example, it is common to hear calls for the introduction of oversight to drone campaigns. Political scientists generally have a good sense of which proposed institutional arrangements might provide successful oversight because we are trained to consider issues like incentive compatibility. Further, we’re likely to have knowledge of oversight institutions at work in other countries that might be emulated. My own [proposal](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138141/omar-s-bashir/who-watches-the-drones) is based on adaptation of the UK’s system of independent review for terrorism legislation. I think it addresses the single most important ethical issue regarding drone strikes: we have no way of knowing whether or not the U.S. government is acting in accordance with the requirements of necessity, discrimination, and proportionality. Inconsistent studies of post-strike damage have not settled the issue, and we can’t simply take the Obama administration at its word. Instead, the government needs something beyond existing congressional review to demonstrate credibly to audiences at home and abroad that too many civilians are not dying compared to the threat posed by targets and to show that there is appropriate cause for deeming individuals targetable. This oversight, which can ideally provide some indication when strikes begin to violate the requirement of proportionality, may be the key to preventing “endless war”: it might help us know when, if not already, campaigns have taken out so many targets that further killing cannot be justified. Clinton Watts and Frank Cilluffo propose another tangible solution that has a chance of being acceptable both to government and ~~human~~ rights advocates. Their idea is based on the modification of an existing American institution, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court; it is covered in [this](http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=813) post. If you are aware of other proposals, please link them in the comments, and feel free to post your own ideas.

#### Debating about the intricacies about drone policy is that first step

Ishaan Tharoor writes about “The Debate on Drones” in 2013 that (Ishaan, writer for Times. The Debate on Drones: Away from the Politics, the Nameless Dead Remain Read more: <http://world.time.com/2013/02/08/the-debate-on-drones-away-from-the-politics-the-nameless-dead-remain/#ixzz2c3KKvqQS>)

What complicates those hundreds of civilian deaths is the official silence that surrounds them. The U.S. government has so far refused to publicly recognize its culpability in what are clandestine missions away from the Afghan theater of operations, while its Pakistani counterparts, who to an extent allowed and abetted the CIA’s drone program, would rather not own up to their own tacit role in supporting many of the strikes. “Both sides are trapped in their own double-dealing,” writes Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid in his new book, Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. “The Americans cannot discuss drones, because they are a classified CIA operation, while Pakistan pretends it never sanctioned the drones or provided intelligence to the United States, for fear of riling up the militants.” The awkward geopolitical pas de deux leaves the victims of drone strikes and their families in the dark. Some rights groups and activists have already started collecting testimony from villagers in places like North and South Waziristan. The aforementioned London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism announced Thursday [a project to determine the names](http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/02/04/naming-the-dead-bureau-announces-new-drones-project/) of as many of the reported fatalities of drone strikes in Pakistan as possible. The endeavor will be a difficult one, not least because it will require prying information out of U.S. and Pakistani officials. “In the face of official secrecy, having the full facts about who is killed is essential for an informed debate about the effectiveness and ethics of the drone campaign,” said Christopher Hird, managing editor of the Bureau, in a statement posted on its website. [An editorial](http://dawn.com/2013/02/07/not-credible-enough/) the same day in the prominent Pakistani daily Dawn, concurred: “More information is needed to convince both Americans and Pakistanis that their civil liberties are not being eroded in the name of their security.” The more we learn about drones, the more we should know about who they kill.

## 2AC

### Ben-Nafti

#### Their impact is wrong – debate over even the most technical issues improves decision-making and advocacy

Ben- Naftali ‘3 (Orna Ben-Naftali, Head of the International Law Division and of the Law and Culture Division, The Law School, The College of Management Academic Studies, Spring 2003, ARTICLE: 'We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law': A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 Cornell Int'l L.J. 233)

Our analysis concludes that while a specific act of preemptive killing may be legal if it meets the above-specified requirements, the policy of state targeted preemptive killings is not. Furthermore, some specific acts of targeted killings may generate state responsibility, while others may constitute a war crime entailing criminal accountability. These conclusions, emanating from the reading of the three legal texts applicable to the context, and informed by a sensibility that coheres them, do not rest on a negation of the importance of the national interest in security. On the contrary, these conclusions incorporate and express the way it should be balanced with a minimum standard of humanity and against the relevant context. This delicate, ever precarious balance is at the heart of the democratic discourse. A democratic state is not a meek state. True, it is fighting with "one hand tied behind its back,"n342 as soberly observed by Chief Justice Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court, but democratic sensibilities internalize this limitation on State power, not as a source of weakness but as a sign of strength. Democracies require a public discourse forever alert to the importance of human rights, suspicious of the way power is used, and committed to the rule of law. The legal culture, in turn, while not a substitute for this public discourse, is never absent from it and indeed serves as a catalyst for its development. We therefore reject the notion that the policy of targeted killings, designed by Israel as a way to combat terrorist attacks, is beyond the purview of the rule of law.n343 We also deny the purist position suggesting that the legalistic nitty-gritty preoccupation with details entailed in the above discussion is likely to obscure and legitimize a harrowing policy; n344 one that, on principle, should be condemned. n345 This position in fact maintains that the legality or illegality of targeted state killings is not a legitimate issue of discussion; that while an emergency situation may exceptionally necessitate the deed, it should never be elevated to the sphere of the Word. n346 We appreciate the sensibility of this position, but, alas, do not find it sensible. Indeed, nor would the people who consider themselves victims of the policy of targeted killings, and appeal to the courts to intervene. n347 Purity belongs to the Platonic world of ideas; it is a necessary ideal to strive for, even if forever unachievable in this all too fallible City of Man. n348 In the best of all possible worlds law would be superfluous; in this world, it is a necessary, albeit insufficient means to achieve some possible betterment. This article hopes to contribute to this modest goal.

### Yemeni Women

#### Their alternative has no space that allows for Yemeni women- we must look outside the window with the mirror

Jilani ’13 (Zaid Jilani is the former communications and outreach coordinator for United Republic and the former senior reporter-blogger for ThinkProgress. His work has also appeared in outlets including Salon and the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, “The Perpetual Drone War in Yemen”, <http://billmoyers.com/2013/08/16/the-perpetual-drone-war-in-yemen/>, August 16, 2013)

“The use of drones is heavily constrained,” said President Obama during his May speech about national security matters, held in response to growing criticism of the U.S. drone program. “Before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured.” Obama went on to promise to repeal some of his own war powers, saying that he intends to “engage Congress about the existing Authorization to Use Military Force, or AUMF, to determine how we can continue to fight terrorism without keeping America on a perpetual wartime footing.” Obama’s speech elicited praise from many as signaling a shift towards a more restrained drone policy overseas. The New York Times editorial board said that it was “the most important statement on counterterrorism policy since the 2001 attacks,” and that the president “stated clearly and unequivocally that the state of perpetual warfare that began 12 years ago is unsustainable for a democracy and must come to an end in the not-too-distant-future.” Seven thousand miles away in Yemen, Obama’s words seem to be disintegrating along with the wreckage strewn along strike sites, where the U.S. launched nine drone strikes in recent weeks. The bombardment makes Yemen the epicenter of the air war this year with 21 airstrikes. (Pakistan is a close second with 18.) Far from narrowing war powers, the strikes in Yemen seem to be widening them. The terror threat that spawned the closing of U.S. embassies across the Arab world “expanded the scope of people we could go after” in Yemen, one unnamed administration official told The New York Times. “Before, we couldn’t necessarily go after a driver for the organization; it’d have to be the operations director. Now that driver becomes fair game because he’s providing direct support to the plot.” It wasn’t immediately clear who was killed in the strikes. Reports put the death toll at 38. The U.S. was quick to claim it had targeted and killed operatives with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), but a Yemeni official from that country’s Defense Ministry told CNN that “nearly a dozen of the killed over the past two weeks are believed to have been innocent.”



### Heuristic

#### ---No link and turn --- our 1AC provides a heuristic for the alt -- Focusing on drones doesn’t preclude criticisms of targeted killing policy and is a critical prerequisite to the alternative.

Noble July 19th 2012

Doug, activist with Occupy Rochester NY and Rochester Against War, Assassination Nation: Fifty Years of US Targeted ‘Kill Lists’: From the Phoenix Program to Predator Drones, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article31925.htm

The purpose of this article is to reframe the current attention on killer drones and Obama’s “kill list” within an historical perspective. The goal here is not to discourage the escalating protest against killer drones or against Obama’s targeted assassination program around the globe. As stated at the outset, the unprecedented visibility of these nefarious activities and of the outraged public response to them is precisely what is needed at this time. This heightened awareness also affords a perfect opportunity to revisit the extraordinary history of US assassination and targeted killing that has led directly and explicitly to these activities.

### Porter

#### The Compassion disad- Affirming this ethic of compassion is an ethical necessity – only by privileging compassion can we stop otherization which causes violence

Porter ‘6 (Elisabeth, head of the School of International Studies at the University of South Australia, “Can Politics Practice Compassion?” hypatia 21:4, project muse)

I am defending the position that it is possible to be politically compassionate and just and that such a claim should be disentangled from notions of gender.12 I dispute the essentialist claim that women are naturally compassionate. However, because of women's traditional association with caring and their role as primary parent, many women are experienced in caring and tend to respond readily with compassion. As others also argue (Philips 1993, 70; Sevenhuijsen 1998, 13), I am emphasizing the interplay between the particularity of compassion and the universality of justice. Undoubtedly, the dichotomy of public justice associated with masculinity and private care associated with femininity narrowed moral parameters, harmfully cementing restrictive gendered stereotypes. Rather, the relationship between compassion and justice is rich. Compassion "helps us recognize our justice obligations to those distant from us" (Clement 1996, 85). Examples of justice obligations include welfare programs; foreign aid; famine and disaster relief; humane immigration policies; and relieving the suffering of families who are affected by terrorism in Bali, Iraq, Israel, London, Morocco, Northern Ireland, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, the United States, and elsewhere. A choice between justice and compassion is false; considerations of justice "arise in and about the practice of care" (Bubeck 1995a, 189). Thus, a defense of the need for compassion is as much a defense for the rights of justice. Anticipating this defense was Elizabeth Bartlett's (1992) interpretation of Albert Camus' concept of rebellion in the novel The Plague. She made three points that resonate with my argument on the relationship between justice and care. First, justice originates from care. In Camus' ethic of rebellion, the passionate demand for justice and rights comes from compassionately witnessing and being outraged by such aggressive acts as battering, abuse, or police brutality, such incomprehensible injustices as innocent children suffering from malnutrition, and various forms of others' oppression. As Bartlett remarked, "It is these moments of compassionate recognition of human dignity, not a dispassionate calculation of rights, which give rise to the demand for justice" (1992, 84). Second, both justice and care imply community. In The Plague, rebellion is a rejection of all forms of oppression. Acts of compassion are choices to "suffer with" others in order to build solidarity.13 Third, care defines justice. For Camus, "only those actions which retain the impulse and commitment to care serve justice" through compassionate responses (Bartlett 1992, 86). This strong notion of compassionate justice in politics is necessary if we are to respond meaningfully to peoples' pain. The defense of compassionate justice is prominent in feminist literature because of women's historical experience of injustice and because of women's traditional association of caring. It is also prominent in postcolonial and development discourse where there are attempts to redress political injustice with the practical, compassionate development of human well-being. Responsibility for Connections The third potential barrier to realizing political compassion lies in the controversy as to who and what we are responsible for. I have argued elsewhere that responsibilities are based on the principles of connection (1991, 159). We carry out responsibilities through moral engagement with others. The question, "how can I (we) best meet my (our) caring responsibilities?" (Tronto 1993, 137) is central to, but not exclusive to feminist ethics. Jean-Marc Coicaud and Daniel Warner, in expanding the relational dimension of ethics, argue that "somehow, we owe something to others and that our ability to handle what we owe to others decides in some sense who we are" (2001, 2). Yet this is not easy in practice. In our socially embodied moral world, our identities, relationships, and values differentially define our responsibilities. Practices of responsibility are situated culturally and many need changing. For example, in a materialist, technocratic age dominated by self-interest, compassionate impulses toward those who are suffering are dismissed readily as time-consuming, or consciences are salved by a quick donation to charity while complaining of "compassion fatigue." Yet after the anguish of 9/11, people in many nations reassessed their priorities and lifestyles, reaching out to loved ones and strangers in affirming ways.14 Some feminists see the particularity of responsibility as an obstacle to realizing political compassion. For example, Susan Mendus argues that "identity and morality are constituted by actual relationships of care between particular people," thus the concept of care does not translate readily to the wider political problems of hunger, poverty, refugee status, and war that require solutions for people we do not know (2000, 106). As I am arguing, it is not care alone or a particular relationship of care that enables compassionate responsibility, but a merging of a compassionate drive with a search for justice, equality, and rights. **Caring for someone necessarily encompasses a concern for his or her equality and rights.** I am supporting a strong notion of compassionate justice that accepts responsibilities toward "particular others" who can include "actual starving children in Africa with whom one feels empathy" (Held 1987, 118). If we take seriously the idea of global interdependence, then regardless of our specific nationalities and races, we have "duties" to people who are distant from us and belong to other communities (Midgley 1999, 161). Amartya Sen also believes we have a "multiplicity of loyalties" (1996, 113) to humanity, our nation, city, community, family, and friends. Simone Weil's notion of "justice as compassion" also is one in which mutual respect for all humans grounds our obligations to prevent suffering and harm. She believes that we have an unconditional obligation not to let a single human suffer "when one has the chance of coming to his assistance" (quoted in R. Bell 1998, 114).15 This qualifier is important. **We cannot assume responsibility for all suffering, to do so is naïve. We can assume, however, some responsibility to try to alleviate suffering whenever we can.** Yet, as intimated earlier, in order to move beyond empathy, we must also address claims for justice and equality. Again, I suggest that without the compassionate drive that is prompted by visualizing the pain of injustice, we will not feel peoples' anguish, or bother to consider what they need. As individuals, we have responsibilities beyond our personal connections to assist whenever it is within our capacities and resources to do so. I do not want to give the impression that our entire lives should be devoted to attending to others' needs. To do so would return women to exclusive nurturance at the expense of self-development and public citizenship. It is, rather, a matter of acting with compassion when it is possible to do so, and the possibility of course is debatable and requires priorities, which differ with us all. Politically, this means that politicians, nations, and international organizations have a similar responsibility to alleviate the suffering that results when peoples' basic needs are not met. There is a heavy responsibility on wealthy nations where the extent of poverty and misery is not as conspicuous as elsewhere to assist less wealthy nations.16 State responsibility is acute when suffering is caused by harsh economic policies, careless sales of arms and military weapons, severe immigration rules, and obscene responses to terrorism by further acts of violence. With the majority of these massive global issues, most of us can only demonstrate the first stage of co-suffering, and perhaps move to the second and debate the merit of options that might meet peoples' needs, and alleviate suffering. This **vocal civic debate can provoke** the third process **of political responses that actually lead to political compassion. Given nations' moral failures of compassion and such conspicuous evidence of oppression, exploitation, brutality, and indifference, we need to** be observant, and understand the implications of a failure to practice compassion. To summarize this section, the conceptual barriers that prevent the practice of political compassion are significant but surmountable. Compassion is not too personal for politics. Rather**, it can be the emotion that helps prompt a critical scrutiny of institutional structures; it is the driving force toward the practice of compassionate justice**; and, as an emotion and response, it broadens political responsibilities. Political Compassion I now argue that political compassion is linked to the political goals of a good society and is achievable politically.17 This argument contrasts with that of Hannah Arendt, who wrote that compassion abolishes the distance between citizens and thus is "politically speaking, irrelevant and without consequence" (1973, 86). Arendt's belief is that whereas the public arena is a site for deliberation, dissent, and argument, compassion requires a direct response that talking distorts. Certainly, too much abstract discussion on poverty, asylum seekers, detention camps, or the effects of war delays actual decisions for change. However, later, I argue that dialogue is a crucial way for all concerned groups to ascertain the best way to respond to peoples' feelings of vulnerability. Particularly in the current global climate of heightened vulnerability to terrorist attacks, the need for protection is powerful. Within liberal democracies, we are more accustomed to emphases on autonomy and self-sufficiency than the need for protection. While care ethics recognizes that we all are vulnerable in the sense that fortune and fate are "morally arbitrary" (Porter 1995, 181) and this is why it is important that we care about each other, most care ethics literature refers to the vulnerable either as children or as those requiring [End Page 109] welfare, disability rights, or health care. In the present international context, we often lose sight of personal powerlessness and politically equate vulnerability with minimizing the possibility of terrorist threats. Considerations of national security thus dominate over human security. Certainly, terrorist threats must be dealt with appropriately, **but the means of national protection should not be at the expense of the emotional safety of** such **vulnerable groups** as asylum seekers. States need to maximize security, but "there are broader understandings of human security that encompass social well-being and the security of political, civil, social, cultural, and economic rights" (Porter 2003b, 9). The defense of human security can adopt an attitude toward the vulnerable of protective "holding," which minimizes harmful risk and reconciles differences (Ruddick 1990, 78–79). How democratic nations deal with the vilification or reconciliation of cultural and religious differences is central to the practice of political compassion. For example, asylum seekers rightfully seek refuge, safety, and security, under United Nations conventions. These rights include the right to seek asylum and the right to request assistance to secure safety in their own countries. Those seeking such rights increasingly are facing governments with tightened borders. In multicultural states, tolerance, trust, and openness are essential for positive civic relationships. **Since 9/11, there has been a movement away from open tolerance to closed dichotomies based on an "othering,"** a stereotyping of groups considered different from "us." **These dichotomies are not harmless opposites; they "mask the power of one side of the binary to control the other**" (D. Bell 2002, 433**), like us/them, citizen/foreigner, friends/enemies, and good/evil. Absolutist dichotomies are blind to nuances, middle-ground positions, particular contexts, and connections, all the considerations of judgment needed for wise, compassionate decisions**. Importantly, absolutist dichotomies are oblivious to the pain of those who are excluded, those most in need of protection. They make people feel "at risk" simply for looking different or having a different faith. Those with absolutist views see "illegal immigrants" and "queue jumpers" rather than desperate, fearful people seeking legitimate asylum. A classic example of this binary control is President George W. Bush's ultimatum, "If you're not with us, you're against us**." A simplistic with us/against us**, free world/axis of **evil analysis cements an inclusion/exclusion that fails to comprehend the pain of those who are excluded**.

### Taylor

#### The global drone bleeds into the local- either we resist strikes or we’ll face them at home- voting NEG means the decision is made by the Empire

**Taylor ‘13** [Robert Taylor has been writing for PolicyMic since January 2011, he spends his time writing, studying, protesting wars, and advocating the virtues of economic and political freedom., and dedicates himself to undermining the state's ability to initiate aggression against peaceful people, “Obama Drone Memo Sets Dangerous Precedent For Domestic Drone Use,” <http://www.policymic.com/articles/24983/obama-drone-memo-sets-dangerous-precedent-for-domestic-drone-use>]

One of the most defining characteristics of empires and countries with large military establishments is the tendency of these states to employ the tools of foreign subjugation domestically on the people they claim to be protecting. All historic empires expand and turn on themselves; states, especially militarily aggressive ones, grow like cancer cells, eventually overwhelm and destroying their host.¶ America is no different. While drone technology was in its infancy during the Bush administration, it has grown under President Obama to be a staple of his foreign policy. The Pentagon now operates over 7,500 unmanned drones and have been used to bomb Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa with horrendous collateral damage and dubious claims of legality.¶ While aggressive war, in whatever form, is often rationalized as being employed only against a supposed foreign enemy, the Justice Department affirmed the boomeranging nature of military interventionism in a leak detailing the Obama administration's legal code for targeting and killing American citizens with drones. ¶ The memo claims that the president can suspend the Fifth Amendment without submitting evidence to court, without congressional oversight, and without making it's legal reasoning available to the public. In typical government-speak, the Justice Department expands on already vague and broad domestic and international laws in claiming powers that as the ACLU's Jameel Jaffer puts it, "redefines the word imminence in a way that deprives the word of its ordinary meaning.”¶ Since the Obama administration has already targeted and killed two American citizens with drone strikes with only an embarrassingly minimal outrage among the American public, it is interesting that the Justice Department appears to be working hard on finding legal justification for these attacks. Perhaps the Obama administration is trying to cover its tracks. More likely, however, is that in a similar way to how Obama was scrambling to write a legal code to govern his illegal drone wars in case Republican Mitt Romney was elected in 2012, this is an attempt to codify and institutionalize the targeted assassination of American citizens.¶ Does this mean that drone missiles will be screeching through Omaha tomorrow? No, but what it does signify is another example of empires looking inward. All one has to do is take a peek back at American history to see the trend of domestic authoritarianism that results directly from war.¶ During the Spanish-American War, the U.S. military imposed drug prohibition and waterboarded captives during their occupation of the Philippines. Within a decade, both of these policies found their way across the Pacific. During WWI, while claiming to fight oppressive monarchies, President Woodrow Wilson initiated a brutal and draconian police state on the home front. Income-tax withholding was supposed to be a "temporary wartime measure" during WWII.¶ After 9/11, the CIA's global torture regime, with the cooperation of dozens of countries, that took place in former Soviet dungeons was soon unleashed on American hero Bradley Manning. The militarization of domestic law enforcement has its roots in the Iraq and Afghan wars where police, in their language, dress, tactics, and weaponry, resemble an occupying military force rather than protectors of person and property.¶ In other words, the tools and power needed to wage aggressive war — and in our current case, a permanent "war on terror" — set precedents that slowly find their way to be used domestically for largely the same reasons they are deployed abroad. How many times have you heard a modern president use a previous president's crimes to justify his own? Hey, if Lincoln suspended habeus corpus and FDR ran concentration camps, why shouldn't the president have his own secret assassins?¶ So it is only the logical next step that the Obama administration would expand on Bush's authoritarian claims of power by not only expanding on virtually every one of Bush's violations of domestic and international law, but by codifying news ones leaked in the memo. The only difference — in this case, weaponized robots — is the technology.¶ This is why the struggle for liberty and limiting state power goes hand in hand with opposing aggressive war and exposing the harm that it does not only to the countries the U.S. is currently targeting but to us domestically as well. War (except in the rare occasion of self-defense) is and always has been a racket, the health of the state, and an enemy of civilization. The threat posed by America's "enemies," since at least the Cold War, have always been highly inflated and exaggerated.¶ Crushing debt, loss of liberties and wealth, millions of casualties, an evisceration of the Bill of Rights, and a hollowing out of the soul of constitutional government: Is empire really worth it?¶ As the late Chalmers Johnson argued, either we abandon our empire or we'll live under it. And now with a president that claims the legal power, as judge, jury, and executioner, to suspend due process and assassinate American citizens from the sky, we're slowly running out of time before that decision is made for us.

### Perm

#### Thus we advocate Lee and I take a position that targeted killings by the United States Federal Government or by structural violence that frames particular bodies as “trouble” should be restricted --- this isn’t a cooptation but a recognition that both strategies are valuable

### Physco

#### No empirical basis for scaling up psychoanalysis

Epstein, senior lecturer in government and IR – University of Sydney, ‘10

(Charlotte, “Who speaks? Discourse, the subject and the study of identity in international politics,” European Journal of International Relations XX(X) 1–24)

One key advantage of the Wendtian move, granted even by his critics (see Flockhart, 2006), is that it simply does away with the level-of-analysis problem altogether. If states really are persons, then we can apply everything we know about people to understand how they behave. The study of individual identity is not only theoretically justified but it is warranted. This cohesive self borrowed from social psychology is what allows Wendt to bridge the different levels of analysis and travel between the self of the individual and that of the state, by way of a third term, ‘group self’, which is simply an aggregate of individual selves. Thus for Wendt (1999: 225) ‘the state is simply a “group Self” capable of group level cognition’. Yet that the individual possesses a self does not logically entail that the state possesses one too. It is in this leap, from the individual to the state, that IR’s fallacy of composition surfaces most clearly. Moving beyond Wendt but maintaining the psychological self as the basis for theorizing the state Wendt’s bold ontological claim is far from having attracted unanimous support (see nota­bly, Flockhart, 2006; Jackson, 2004; Neumann, 2004; Schiff, 2008; Wight, 2004). One line of critique of the states-as-persons thesis has taken shape around the resort to psy­chological theories, specifically, around the respective merits of Identity Theory (Wendt) and SIT (Flockhart, 2006; Greenhill, 2008; Mercer, 2005) for understanding state behav­iour.9 Importantly for my argument, that the state has a self, and that this self is pre-social, remains unquestioned in this further entrenching of the psychological turn. Instead questions have revolved around how this pre-social self (Wendt’s ‘Ego’) behaves once it encounters the other (Alter): whether, at that point (and not before), it takes on roles prescribed by pre-existing cultures (whether Hobbessian, Lockean or Kantian) or whether instead other, less culturally specific, dynamics rooted in more universally human char­acteristics better explain state interactions. SIT in particular emphasizes the individual’s basic need to belong, and it highlights the dynamics of in-/out-group categorizations as a key determinant of behaviour (Billig, 2004). SIT seems to have attracted increasing interest from IR scholars, interestingly, for both critiquing (Greenhill, 2008; Mercer, 1995) and rescuing constructivism (Flockhart, 2006). For Trine Flockart (2006: 89–91), SIT can provide constructivism with a different basis for developing a theory of agency that steers clear of the states-as-persons thesis while filling an important gap in the socialization literature, which has tended to focus on norms rather than the actors adopting them. She shows that a state’s adherence to a new norm is best understood as the act of joining a group that shares a set of norms and val­ues, for example the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). What SIT draws out are the benefits that accrue to the actor from belonging to a group, namely increased self-esteem and a clear cognitive map for categorizing other states as ‘in-’ or ‘out-group’ members and, from there, for orientating states’ self–other relationships. Whilst coming at it from a stance explicitly critical of constructivism, for Jonathan Mercer (2005: 1995) the use of psychology remains key to correcting the systematic evacuation of the role of emotion and other ‘non-rational’ phenomena in rational choice and behaviourist analyses, which has significantly impaired the understanding of inter­national politics. SIT serves to draw out the emotional component of some of the key drivers of international politics, such as trust, reputation and even choice (Mercer, 2005: 90–95; see also Mercer, 1995). Brian Greenhill (2008) for his part uses SIT amongst a broader array of psychological theories to analyse the phenomenon of self–other recog­nition and, from there, to take issue with the late Wendtian assumption that mutual recognition can provide an adequate basis for the formation of a collective identity amongst states. The main problem with this psychological turn is the very utilitarian, almost mecha­nistic, approach to non-rational phenomena it proposes, which tends to evacuate the role of meaning. In other words, it further shores up the pre-social dimension of the concept of self that is at issue here. Indeed norms (Flockhart, 2006), emotions (Mercer, 2005) and recognition (Greenhill, 2008) are hardly appraised as symbolic phenomena. In fact, in the dynamics of in- versus out-group categorization emphasized by SIT, language counts for very little. Significantly, in the design of the original experiments upon which this approach was founded (Tajfel, 1978), whether two group members communicate at all, let alone share the same language, is non-pertinent. It is enough that two individuals should know (say because they have been told so in their respec­tive languages for the purposes of the experiment) that they belong to the same group for them to favour one another over a third individual. The primary determinant of individual behaviour thus emphasized is a pre-verbal, primordial desire to belong, which seems closer to pack animal behaviour than to anything distinctly human. What the group stands for, what specific set of meanings and values binds it together, is unimportant. What matters primarily is that the group is valued positively, since posi­tive valuation is what returns accrued self-esteem to the individual. In IR Jonathan Mercer’s (2005) account of the relationship between identity, emotion and behaviour reads more like a series of buttons mechanically pushed in a sequence of the sort: posi­tive identification produces emotion (such as trust), which in turn generates specific patterns of in-/out-group discrimination. Similarly, Trine Flockhart (2006: 96) approaches the socializee’s ‘desire to belong’ in terms of the psychological (and ultimately social) benefits and the feel-good factor that accrues from increased self-esteem. At the far opposite of Lacan, the concept of desire here is reduced to a Benthamite type of pleasure- or utility-maximization where mean­ing is nowhere to be seen. More telling still is the need to downplay the role of the Other in justifying her initial resort to SIT. For Flockhart (2006: 94), in a post-Cold War con­text, ‘identities cannot be constructed purely in relation to the “Other”’. Perhaps so; but not if what ‘the other’ refers to is the generic, dynamic scheme undergirding the very concept of identity. At issue here is the confusion between the reference to a specific other, for which Lacan coined the concept of *le petit autre*, and the reference to *l’Autre*, or Other, which is that symbolic instance that is essential to the making of *all* selves. As such it is not clear what meaning Flockhart’s (2006: 94) capitalization of the ‘Other’ actually holds. The individual self as a proxy for the state’s self Another way in which the concept of self has been centrally involved in circumventing the level-of-analysis problem in IR has been to treat the self of the individual as a proxy for the self of the state. The literature on norms in particular has highlighted the role of individuals in orchestrating norm shifts, in both the positions of socializer (norm entre­preneurs) and socializee. It has shown for example how some state leaders are more sus­ceptible than others to concerns about reputation and legitimacy and thus more amenable to being convinced of the need to adopt a new norm, of human rights or democratization, for example (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 2001). It is these specific psychological qualities pertaining to their selves (for example, those of Gorbachev; Risse, 2001) that ultimately enable the norm shift to occur. Once again the individual self ultimately remains the basis for explaining the change in state behaviour. To summarize the points made so far, whether the state is literally considered as a person by ontological overreach, whether so only by analogy, or whether the person stands as a proxy for the state, the ‘self’ of that person has been consistently taken as the reference point for studying state identities. Both in Wendt’s states-as-persons thesis, and in the broader psychological turn within constructivism and beyond, the debate has con­sistently revolved around the need to evaluate which of the essentialist assumptions about human nature are the most useful for explaining state behaviour. It has never ques­tioned the validity of starting from these assumptions in the first place. That is, what is left unexamined is this assumption is that what works for individuals will work for states too. This is IR’s central fallacy of composition, by which it has persistently eschewed rather than resolved the level-of-analysis problem. Indeed, in the absence of a clear dem­onstration of a logical identity (of the type A=A) between states and individuals, the assumption that individual interactions will explain what states do rests on little more than a leap of faith, or indeed an analogy.

#### There is no universal psyche – there can be no generalizable claims about resentement or adverse reactions

Brickman ‘3 [Celia (Center for Religion and Psychotherapy of Chicago, PhD in Religion and the Human Sciences at the University of Chicago); Aboriginal Populations in the Mind: Race and Primitivity in Psychoanalysis; Columbia University Press; New York; p. 206-7 //nick]

When psychoanalysis supplies a phylogenetic content to the unconscious, it dictates a universal, ahistorical, and precultural stratum of the human mind, repressed or repudiated since infantile or “primitive” times, as the cost for the inauguration of an enculturated subjectivity. Although there may always be some exclusions brought into being through the inauguration of subjectivity, these exclusions would vary with culture and history, and therefore be open to some degree of alteration. 22 To assert that we already know the contents (phylogenetic or otherwise) of the unconscious in all cases and in all cultures denies the risk of the unknown that a true encounter with the other always poses to our own certainties of knowledge. In addition, the formulation of subjectivity as predicated on a repudiation of a universal, precultural primitivity reinforces the binarism of nature and culture, since it understands our entry into culture as condemning us to be forever and inescapably alienated from the “natural”—primitive——part of ourselves (and thus from those peoples identified as part of nature), setting the scene for the analyst as the authority who can inform us about the contents of this inaccessible part of ourselves. (As we have seen, it is not only the patient who falls into the trap of believing that the analyst is “the subject who is supposed to know.”)23But if the unconscious can be released from a developmental framework in which subjectivity is premised exclusively on repudiation or separation, then it need not be imagined as an abjected, inaccessible primitivity. Then the emergence of unconscious contents in the analytic encounter need not be insctibed as a regression back down the developmental scale but can be seen as the emergence of dimensions of experience whose existence has been obscured by, but is nonetheless coeval with, the preoccupations of consciousness. The encounter with the unconscious is a return to moments of the past simply insofar as it allows us to dc-sediment the identifications that have contributed to subjectivity; insofar as it allows us, as Cornelius Castoriadis has suggested, to consider subjectivity from the vantage point of its contingency, from the vantage point of how it became fixed or essentialized as that which it now is.24 The analytic relationship need not be about the imposition of authoritative knowledge nor about disabusing the analysand of the fantasy of the analyst’s authority. It can be a way of coming to know oneself, of becoming capable of feeling more fully alive, and of engaging more fully with the world through being with—rather than being dominated by, or fearing domination by—another. The interminability of analysis, rather than due to a bedrock of resistance to a primitivity that can never be overcome, would then have to do with the fact that the unconscious always exceeds our capacity to understand it: no analysis can ever exhaust it and thus truly come to an end.

#### Their paradigm of the psyche arises from a colonial paradigm. Colonized cultures are mined for a glimpse of the so-called primitive psyche, unfettered by superegoic fantasy.

Brickman ‘3 [Celia (Center for Religion and Psychotherapy of Chicago, PhD in Religion and the Human Sciences at the University of Chicago); Aboriginal Populations in the Mind: Race and Primitivity in Psychoanalysis; Columbia University Press; New York; p. 118-119 //nick]

But a subjectivity (psychoanalytically conceived of as) emerging through separation and exclusion produces an excluded remainder - the primitive/maternal as the matrix of undifferentiated being—that becomes identified with actual gendered and raced others who are held to be both psychologically and socially inferior. Lacanian, Krisrevan, and object relations perspectives all posit subjectivity as founded through separations, exclusions, and repressions, which in turn presuppose an initial stage of infancy in which the infant cannot distinguish between self and other, between self and surround: they all posit a period of undifferentiated immersion in the natural and maternal relationship from which the subject must separate. To this we may juxtapose Freud’s contention that the historical/evolutionary emergence of individual subjectivity was effected by separation from submergence in the social ties of primary identification and enthrallment that held primitive communities together, constituting a “group mind” in which group members lacked individuality, which is to say they were undifferentiated from one another. In both cases, what is separated from or excluded becomes repressed but continues to threaten the subject via regression to an annihilating absorption in primitive/maternal undifferentiation. Theories that see the subject as formed through separation and exclusion require the prior hypothesis of this preexisting undifferentiation, which is identified with the maternal in a developmental register; and which, through the psychoanalytic identification of maternity with primitivity, is identified with the primitive in an evolutionary register. In this preexisting undifferentiation we can see, in Homi Bhabha’s words, “the impossible desire for a pure, undifferentiated origin” with which the “‘official knowledges’ of colonialism are imbricated.”93 Development is then conceived in terms of the distance effected by separation from and repudiation of a relationship of undifferentiation with mother/nature/primitivity, through the mediation of the father/civilizing law. Particularly in the Lacanian-derived accounts, the very possibility of achieving subjectivity, of participating in the representational structures that govern one’s existence, is predicated on a repudiation or splitting off of the maternal, primitive, abjected elements of the psyche. This repudiation is figured as the crucial operation necessary to the attainment of cultural legibility; it is figured as inevitable, universal, and ahistoric, As Butler writes, from this perspective it seems that there is no possibility of speaking, of taking a position in language outside of differentiating moves, not only through a differentiation from the maternal which is said to install a speaker in language for the first time, but [through] further differentiations among speakers positioned within kinship.94 The laws of language and subjectivity appear to be part of an unavoidable prison of gender and racial asymmetry: if one tries to escape the repudiation of the primitive/maternal one refuses the possibility of speaking, of being heard, of becoming a subject at all.

#### Global war does not result from a Western desire for control---it results from lack of clearly defined strategic imperatives---the aff is necessary to reclaim the political

David Chandler **9**, Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster, War Without End(s): Grounding the Discourse of `Global War', Security Dialogue 2009; 40; 243

Western governments appear to portray some of the distinctive characteristics that Schmitt attributed to ‘motorized partisans’, in that the shift from narrowly strategic concepts of security to more abstract concerns reflects the fact that Western states have tended to fight free-floating and non-strategic wars of aggression without real enemies at the same time as professing to have the highest values and the absolute enmity that accompanies these. The government policy documents and critical frameworks of ‘global war’ have been so accepted that it is assumed that it is the strategic interests of Western actors that lie behind the often irrational policy responses, with ‘global war’ thereby being understood as merely the extension of instrumental struggles for control. This perspective seems unable to contemplate the possibility that it is the lack of a strategic desire for control that drives and defines ‘global’ war today. ¶ Very few studies of the ‘war on terror’ start from a study of the Western actors themselves rather than from their declarations of intent with regard to the international sphere itself. This methodological framing inevitably makes assumptions about strategic interactions and grounded interests of domestic or international regulation and control, which are then revealed to explain the proliferation of enemies and the abstract and metaphysical discourse of the ‘war on terror’ (Chandler, 2009a). For its radical critics, the abstract, global discourse merely reveals the global intent of the hegemonizing designs of biopower or neoliberal empire, as critiques of liberal projections of power are ‘scaled up’ from the international to the global.¶ Radical critics working within a broadly Foucauldian problematic have no problem grounding global war in the needs of neoliberal or biopolitical governance or US hegemonic designs. These critics have produced numerous frameworks, which seek to assert that global war is somehow inevitable, based on their view of the needs of late capitalism, late modernity, neoliberalism or biopolitical frameworks of rule or domination. From the declarations of global war and practices of military intervention, rationality, instrumentality and strategic interests are read in a variety of ways (Chandler, 2007). Global war is taken very much on its own terms, with the declarations of Western governments explaining and giving power to radical abstract theories of the global power and regulatory might of the new global order of domination, hegemony or empire¶ The alternative reading of ‘global war’ rendered here seeks to clarify that the declarations of global war are a sign of the lack of political stakes and strategic structuring of the international sphere rather than frameworks for asserting global domination. We increasingly see Western diplomatic and military interventions presented as justified on the basis of value-based declarations, rather than in traditional terms of interest-based outcomes. This was as apparent in the wars of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo – where there was no clarity of objectives and therefore little possibility of strategic planning in terms of the military intervention or the post-conflict political outcomes – as it is in the ‘war on terror’ campaigns, still ongoing, in Afghanistan and Iraq. ¶ There would appear to be a direct relationship between the lack of strategic clarity shaping and structuring interventions and the lack of political stakes involved in their outcome. In fact, the globalization of security discourses seems to reflect the lack of political stakes rather than the urgency of the security threat or of the intervention. Since the end of the Cold War, the central problematic could well be grasped as one of withdrawal and the emptying of contestation from the international sphere rather than as intervention and the contestation for control. The disengagement of the USA and Russia from sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans forms the backdrop to the policy debates about sharing responsibility for stability and the management of failed or failing states (see, for example, Deng et al., 1996). It is the lack of political stakes in the international sphere that has meant that the latter has become more open to ad hoc and arbitrary interventions as states and international institutions use the lack of strategic imperatives to construct their own meaning through intervention. As Zaki Laïdi (1998: 95) explains:¶ war is not waged necessarily to achieve predefined objectives, and it is in waging war that the motivation needed to continue it is found. In these cases – of which there are very many – war is no longer a continuation of politics by other means, as in Clausewitz’s classic model – but sometimes the initial expression of forms of activity or organization in search of meaning. . . . War becomes not the ultimate means to achieve an objective, but the most ‘efficient’ way of finding one. ¶ The lack of political stakes in the international sphere would appear to be the precondition for the globalization of security discourses and the ad hoc and often arbitrary decisions to go to ‘war’. In this sense, global wars reflect the fact that the international sphere has been reduced to little more than a vanity mirror for globalized actors who are freed from strategic necessities and whose concerns are no longer structured in the form of political struggles against ‘real enemies’. The mainstream critical approaches to global wars, with their heavy reliance on recycling the work of Foucault, Schmitt and Agamben, appear to invert this reality, portraying the use of military firepower and the implosion of international law as a product of the high stakes involved in global struggle, rather than the lack of clear contestation involving the strategic accommodation of diverse powers and interests.

### Right Fill in

#### Rejection of the state accomplishes NOTHING – they need a pragmatic reimagination of politics to prevent failure of their movement – this card SMOKES the K.

Pasha ’96 [July-Sept. 1996, Mustapha Kamal, Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Aberdeen, “Security as Hegemony”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 283-302, JSTOR]

An attack on the postcolonial state as the author of violence and its drive to produce a modern citizenry may seem cathartic, without producing the semblance of an alternative vision of a new political community or fresh forms of life among existing political communities. Central to this critique is an assault on the state and other modern institutions said to disrupt some putatively natural flow of history. Tradition, on this logic, is uprooted to make room for grafted social forms; modernity gives birth to an intolerant and insolent Leviathan, a repository of violence and instrumental rationality's finest speci- men. Civil society - a realm of humaneness, vitality, creativity, and harmony - is superseded, then torn asunder through the tyranny of state-building. The attack on the institution of the state appears to substitute teleology for ontology. In the Third World context, especially, the rise of the modern state has been coterminous with the negation of past histories, cultures, identities, and above all with violence. The stubborn quest to construct the state as the fount of modernity has subverted extant communities and alternative forms of social organization. The more durable consequence of this project is in the realm of the political imaginary: the constrictions it has afforded; the denials of alternative futures. The postcolonial state, however, has also grown to become more heterodox - to become more than simply modernity's reckless agent against hapless nativism. The state is also seen as an expression of **greater capacities against want, hunger, and injustice**; as an escape from the arbitrariness of communities established on narrower rules of inclusion/exclusion; as identity removed somewhat from capri- cious attachments. No doubt, the modern state has undermined tra- ditional values of tolerance and pluralism, subjecting indigenous so- ciety to Western-centered rationality. But tradition can also conceal particularism and oppression of another kind. Even the most elastic interpretation of universality cannot find virtue in attachments re- furbished by hatred, exclusivity, or religious bigotry. **A negation of the state is no guarantee that a bridge to universality can be built.** Perhaps the task is to rethink modernity, not to seek refuge in a blind celebration of tradition. Outside, the state continues to inflict a self-producing "security dilemma"; inside, it has stunted the emergence of more humane forms of political expres- sion. But there are always sites of resistance that can be recovered and sustained. **A rejection of the state** as a superfluous leftover of modernity that continues to straitjacket the South Asian imagination **must be linked to the project of creating an ethical and humane order**

based on a restructuring of the state system that privileges the mighty and the rich over the weak and the poor.74 Recognizing the constrictions of the modern Third World state, **a reconstruction** of state-society re- lations **inside the state appears to be a more fruitful avenue than wishing the state away, only to be swallowed by Western-centered globalization and its powerful institutions.**A **recognition of the patent failure of other institutions either to deliver the social good or to procure more just distributional rewards in the global political economy may provide a sobering reassessment of the role of the state.** An appreciation of the scale of human tragedy accompanying the collapse of the state in many local contexts may also provide **im- portant points of entry into rethinking the one-sided onslaught on the state**. Nowhere are these costs borne more heavily than in the postcolonial, so-called Third World, where time-space compression has rendered societal processes more savage and less capable of ad- justing to rhythms dictated by globalization

### Welcome

#### PERM is key – only an institutional focus can uncover power relations necessary to mediate the experiences of the oppressed

Welcome 2004 – completing his PhD at the sociology department of the City University of New York's Graduate Center (H. Alexander, "White Is Right": The Utilization of an Improper Ontological Perspective in Analyses of Black Experiences, Journal of African American Studies, Summer-Fall 2004, Vol. 8, No. 1 & 2, pp. 59-73)

In Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture (1970), Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron provide a definition of symbolic violence, stating that it represents "every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, [adding] its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations" (p. 5). This conceptualization provides both an explicit reason for the rejection of whiteness as an ontological frame of analysis for the experiences of blacks and a suggestion as to the circumstances under which the analysis of black experiences should take place. Using the concept of symbolic violence to evaluate Merton's notions of cultural goals and institutional means, one finds that the two latter concepts reflect the workings and concentration of power rather than those "purposes and interests, held out as legitimate objectives for all or for diversely located members of society" (1949, p. 186) and "[the] regulations, rooted inthe mores or institutions, of allowable proceduresfor moving toward these objectives" (1949, p. 167). This indicates that an explication of the dynamics and residence of power should precede any investigation of the experiences and meaning making specific to a group. The failure to do so will produce a situation where arbitrary values and prescriptions for action are utilized and depicted as legitimate. CONCLUSION The works of Johnson (1934), Lewis (1963), and Fordham and Ogbu (1986) have all had a huge influence on the study of black experiences. However, their use of whiteness as an ontological frame of analysis severely hinders the study of black experiences,

just as whiteness as an ontology can have detrimental effects in the study of the experiences of Latinos, Asians, and other ethnic groups. The movements to establish Black Studies, Latino Studies, and Asian Studies programs reflect an attempt to deal with this bias; however, when one looks at the majority of the sociological scholarship, one finds that this ontology is still employed. This problem, if left unchecked, will continue to plague the black community.

### Hooks

#### love ethic is key to solve life-threatening pessimism that leads to nihilism. It’s a pre-requisite to other endeavors

**hooks 1**

Distinguished Professor of English at City College in New York. \*No Capitalization to distinguish from grandmother and to deemphasized author

(bell, “all about love: New Visions”, pg. 77-79, 2001, First Perrenial Edition)

A commitment to spiritual life necessarily means we embrace the eternal principle that love is all, everything, our true destiny. Despite the overwhelming pressure to conform to the culture of lovelessness, we still seek to know love. That seeking is itself a manifestation of divine spirit. Life-threatening nihilism abounds in contemporary culture, crossing the boundaries of race, class, gender, and nationality. At some point it affects all our lives. Everyone I know is at times brought low by feelings of depression and despair about the state of the world. Whether it is the ongoing worldwide presence of violence expressed by the persistence of man-made war, hunger and starvation, the day-to-day reality of violence, the presence of life threatening diseases that cause unexpected deaths of friends, comrades, and loved ones, there is much that brings everyone to the brink of despair. Knowing love or the hope of knowing love is the anchor that keeps us from falling into that sea of despair. In *A Path with Heart,* jack Kornfields shares: “The longing for love and the movement of love is underneath all of our activities.” Spirituality and spiritual life give us the strength to love. It is rare for individuals to choose a life in the spirit, one that honor the sacred dimensions of everyday life when they have had no contact with traditional religious thought or practice. Spiritual teachers are important guides who provide a catalyst for our spiritual awakening. Another source of spiritual growth is communion and fellowship with like-minded souls. Spiritual seekers let their light shine so that others may see not only to give service by example but also to constantly remind themselves that spirituality is most gloriously embodied in our actions-our habits of being. Insightfully Jack Kornfield explains: All other spiritual teachings are in vain if we cannot love. Even the most exalted states and the most exceptional spiritual accomplishments are unimportant if we cannot be happy in the most basic and ordinary ways, if , with our hearts, we cannot touch one another and the life we have been given. What matters is how we live.”

#### Positive affirmations are key to the acceptance of difference. It’s central to a love ethic

**hooks 1**

Distinguished Professor of English at City College in New York. \*No Capitalization to distinguish from grandmother and to deemphasized author

(bell, “all about love: New Visions”, pg. 54, 2001, First Perrenial Edition)

Usually it is through reflection that individuals who have not accepted themselves make the choice to stop listening to negative voices, within and outside the self, that constantly reject and devalue them. Affirmations work for anyone striving for self-acceptance. Although I had for years been interested in therapeutic modes of healing and self-help, affirmations always seemed to me a bit corny. My sister, who was then working as a therapist in the field of chemical dependency, encouraged me to give affirmations a try to see if I would experience any concrete changes in my outlook. I wrote affirmations relevant to my daily life and began to repeat them in the morning as part of my daily meditations. At the top of my list was the declaration: “I’m breaking with old patterns and moving forward with my life.” I not only found them to be a tremendous energy boost-a way to kick off the day by my accentuating the positive-I also found it useful to repeat them during the day if I felt particularly stressed or was falling into the abyss of negative thinking. Affirmations helped restore my emotional equilibrium. Self-acceptance is hard for many of us. There is a voice inside that is constantly judging, first others and then ourselves. That voice enjoys the indulgence of an endless negative critique. Because we have learned to believe negativity is more realistic, it appears more real than any positive voice. Once we begin to replace negative thinking with positive thinking, it becomes utterly clear that, far from being realistic, negative thinking is absolutely disenabling. When we are positive we not only accept and affirm ourselves we are able to affirm and accept others.

## 1AR

### Hooks

#### Domination is the squo - Fear and nihilism are auxiliary tools of that culture-Conversion to an ethic of love is key to solve

**hooks 1**

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(bell, “all about love: New Visions”, pg. 93-94, 2001, First Perrenial Edition)

Cultures of domination rely on the cultivation of fear as a way to ensure obedience. In our society we make much of love and say little about fear. Yet we are all terribly afraid most of the time. As a culture we are obsessed with the notion of safety. Yet we do not question why we live in states of extreme anxiety and dread. Fear is the primary force upholding structures of domination. It promotes the desire for separation, the desire not to be known. When we are taught that safety lies always with sameness, then difference, of any kind, will appear as a threat. When we choose to love we choose to move against fear-against alienation and separation. The choice to love is a choice to connect-to find ourselves in the other. Since so many of us are imprisoned by fear, we can move toward a love ethic only by the process of conversion. Philosopher Cornel West states that “a politics of conversion” restores our sense of hope. Calling attention to the pervasive nihilism in our society he reminds us: “Nihilism is not overcome by arguments or analyses, it is tamed by love and care. Any disease of the soul must be conquered by a turning of one’s soul. This turning is done through one’s own affirmation of one’s worth-an affirmation fueled by the concern of others.” In an attempt to ward off life-threatening despair, more and more individuals are turning toward a love ethic. Signs that this conversion is taking place abound in our culture. It’s reassuring when masses of people read literature like Thomas Moore’s *Care of the Soul,* a work that invites us to reevaluate the values that undergird our lives and make choices that affirm our interconnectedness with others.